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Abstract 
Pogge’s proposal for a Global Resources Dividend (GRD) has been criticised because its 
likely effects would be less predictable than Pogge supposes and could even be 
counterproductive to the main aim of relieving poverty.  The GRD might also achieve little 
with respect to its secondary aim of promoting environmental protection.  This article traces 
the problems to Pogge’s inadequate conception of natural resources.  It proposes instead to 
conceive of natural resources in terms of ‘ecological space’.  Using this conception, 
redistributive principles follow with a more definite logic from Pogge’s own supporting 
moral argument.  The proposed alternative approach also promises a more direct contribution 
to Pogge’s secondary aim of resource conservation and environmental protection.  I conclude 
that if any redistributive resource-based tax should be levied on nations, then there are at least 
four decisive reasons to favour levying a tax related to a nation’s per capita utilisation of 





Thomas Pogge’s Global Resources Dividend: a critique and an alternative  
 
Thomas Pogge’s writings on global justice have attracted a good deal of attention in recent 
years.  Pogge has developed powerful moral arguments in favour of global redistribution of 
wealth, and these are not called into question in the present article.  The focus of attention 
here is the Global Resources Dividend (GRD) which he has proposed as a practical step 
towards the requisite redistribution.  Pogge does not claim this is the only redistributive 
mechanism that could be derived from the moral argument, and certainly does not think it is 
the most the argument could justify - hence his characterisation of it as a ‘modest’ proposal.  
But he does see it as a valuable first step, and one which also promises, as a secondary 
benefit, to help curb environmental pollution and the depletion of natural resources.   
 The problem I address in this article, after briefly describing the basic features of the 
GRD, is that, as others have already suggested, if implemented, the GRD’s likely effects 
would at best be rather less predictable than Pogge supposes and at worst could actually be 
counterproductive to his main aim.  For related reasons the GRD would also do little with 
respect to the secondary aim.  My consideration of these criticisms in section 2 finds them, 
unfortunately, to be well-founded. 
 In section 3 I trace the problems with the GRD proposal to the insufficiently thought 
out conception of natural resources that underpins it.  I suggest that the arbitrariness of the 
GRD’s likely effects is due to elements of arbitrariness in Pogge’s conception of natural 
resources.  A less arbitrary conception, I argue, is one which conceives natural resources in 
terms of ‘ecological space’.  In briefly explaining this idea, I show how it can support 
redistributive principles that follow with a more definite logic from Pogge’s own moral 
justification for redistribution.  Moreover, as well as linking the rectification of radical 
inequalities more directly and robustly to the question of command of natural resources, the 
proposed alternative approach also promises a more direct contribution to Pogge’s secondary 
aim of resource conservation and environmental protection.  In section 4 I respond to an 
anticipated objection regarding the normative basis of my argument, and in doing so expose a 
new question about Pogge’s justificatory argument for the GRD.  I conclude that if any 
redistributive resource-based tax should be levied on nations, then there are at least four 
decisive reasons to favour levying a tax related to a nation’s per capita utilisation of 
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ecological space rather than the GRD.   
 
 
1. Pogge’s proposal 
The GRD is a proposal Pogge has sketched and defended in several publications over a 
number of years.1  What it envisages, in brief, is that ‘states and their governments shall not 
have full libertarian property rights with respect to the natural resources in their territory, but 
can be required to share a small part of the value of any resources they decide to use or sell.’2    
Having initially called it a tax, he has come to refer to the payment they must make as a 
dividend ‘because it is based on the idea that the global poor own an inalienable stake in all 
limited resources.  As in the case of preferred stock, this stake confers no right to participate 
in decisions about whether or how natural resources are to be used and so does not interfere 
with national control over resources, or eminent domain.  But it does entitle its holders to a 
share of the economic value of the resource in question, if indeed the decision is to use it.’3    
Proceeds from the GRD are to be used in the relief of the worst extremes of global poverty, 
with the aim of ensuring that all human beings can meet their own basic needs with dignity.  
Pogge does not believe that an impossibly large amount would need to be raised, and speaks 
of an initial maximal figure of 1 percent of aggregate global income.4   Such a sum could be 
raised, he argues, by targeting a small range of selectively chosen resources. 
 The GRD is thus commended by Pogge as a practical solution to a practical problem.  
That the problem needs to be addressed is a matter of morality.  Because the solution is one 
that requires institutional adoption, he further insists that the morality in question is not 
simply that of individual conscience; moreover, because the solution would require 
enforcement, he also argues that it should be adopted not simply on the grounds of charity but 
of justice.  The basic ‘positive’ obligation on affluent individuals and nations to assist the 
victims of radical inequality, he believes, would be hard to deny by anyone; but what he 
seeks further to establish is that radical inequality manifests ‘an injustice that involves 
violation of a negative duty by the better-off.’5  This involves showing that the better-off are 
engaged in institutionalised practices that are at least in part responsible for radical 
inequalities and so have a negative duty to refrain from those practices, or at least to 
compensate for their effects.  Pogge thus posits causal connections between the wealth of the 
better-off and the poverty of the worse-off.  These are of three main kinds:6  the effects of a 
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shared institutional order, which is controlled largely by the developed countries in virtue of 
their vastly superior military and economic strength; the continuing effects of ‘a common and 
violent history’ which has involved colonial plunder and enslavement; and the 
uncompensated exclusion of the poor from the use of natural resources.  It is this last source 
of injustice that Pogge focuses on in his argument for a GRD.  The other two, he notes, would 
support almost any reform that would improve the circumstances of the global poor.  His 
narrowing of focus yields a more specific idea: ‘those who make more extensive use of our 
planet’s resources should compensate those who, involuntarily, use very little.’7  
 
 
2. Criticisms of the GRD proposal 
In this section I consider criticisms of the GRD on the grounds that, were it implemented, its 
effects would be arbitrary in some significant ways, and so it would not necessarily achieve 
the ends which provide its rationale since.  Those ends themselves, and the moral argument 
that presents them as demands of justice, are not called into question here.  
 A major element of arbitrariness in the proposal concerns its likely distributive 
effects.  As Joseph Heath, for instance, has argued, these could be expected to be at best 
random, and at worst regressive, thus actually disfavouring some of those - the poorest - 
whom it is intended to assist.  The distributive effects would be random because even if the 
proceeds of the dividend go to the poor, it is levied on the extraction of primary resources 
whose territorial distribution includes both some rich and some poor nations.  More crucially, 
in taxing the immediate products of primary extraction, it falls most heavily on those nations 
dependent on such activities rather than upon those with more capital-intensive production 
techniques.  This means, in practice, it could tend to fall on the poorer rather than the richer 
nations.  Recognising this, Pogge’s response is that the cost would be passed on to richer 
nations in the form of higher commodity prices.  Heath bluntly objects that Pogge ‘forgets 
that it will be passed right back to poorer nations, in the form of higher prices for 
manufactured goods, which is what those commodities are exchanged for.’8   Although Pogge 
in fact does not disregard this problem, he can nonetheless only suggest considerations that 
will ‘mitigate’ the regressive effect,9 and even these cannot be established with any certainty.  
For as Dirk Haubrich carefully analyses, there are many economic variables - such as demand 
elasticity and ‘rippling through’ effects - which are involved in determining where the burden 
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of such a tax would fall.10   Pogge does recognise that applying the GRD to certain kinds of 
resources would quite foreseeably harm the poor directly.  He accordingly says that the GRD 
should apply not to the cultivation of basic commodities such as grain, beans or cotton, for 
instance, but rather, when it is land use at issue, to raising cattle or growing crops such as 
tobacco, coffee, cocoa or flowers.11   But such ad hoc qualifications could be seen as 
compounding rather than alleviating the arbitrariness of the proposal.  If poor people are 
under economic pressure to switch from producing food crops to cash crops this would not be 
relieved simply by squeezing profit margins on the latter too. 
 The arbitrariness may also extend to the quantification of the proposed tax.  I do not 
refer simply to the open question about the rate at which it should be set, but more 
fundamentally to the question of identifying the relevant sum of economic value of any given 
resource that the tax would be applied to.  There is a practical dimension to this issue, which 
is worth spelling out on the way to highlighting a question of more critical normative 
significance.  In practice, even the most rudimentary forms of primary production entail a 
number of processes in bringing a raw material, crop, or energy source into a usable and 
marketable state.  At which point of which process should the tax be applied?  Which kinds 
of costs associated with the processes (from initial prospecting, through securing finance, 
providing capital or agricultural infrastructure, the various processes of physical extraction, 
the preparation for physically transferring them, and passing them through merchants for 
presentation on the world market) would be allowable against the tax and at what rate?  
Obviously such questions cannot be addressed a priori or in the abstract, since for any given 
resource in any particular context of its extraction, the range of reasonable answers will vary.  
Pogge’s proposal aims to circumvent all such difficulties with the stipulation that the GRD 
should ‘be based on resources and pollutants whose extraction or discharge is easy to monitor 
or estimate’.12  If we grant that such monitoring and estimating may be possible for some 
resources, and that the national governments responsible for collecting the tax can deal with 
the ingenuity of tax avoiders, there remains a certain arbitrariness in taxing the resources that 
can easily be taxed rather than those which reasons of justice or environmental concern 
suggest should be taxed. The case of oil appears, in this as in other respects, to be a 
favourable one for Pogge’s proposal, given its association with both wealth creation and 
environmental pollution, and it is no coincidence that most of his illustrative remarks assume 
the case of oil.  It is also relatively clear what a GRD on oil would be proportional to: given 
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the cartelized system of oil production, there is effectively a unitary world price that pertains 
to a given quantity and quality of crude oil.  So the GRD could be proportional to this price.  
Such standardisation of production and pricing does not apply to other resources, however.  
And the question why the tax should be applied at the point of extraction, or even at the point 
of exportation, rather than elsewhere remains to be answered. 
 This brings me to what I think is a crucial question whatever resource is at issue: this 
is the question of the justification for imposing the tax on a once only basis at the point of 
extraction.  (There is an arbitrariness about this that I shall further expose and diagnose in the 
next section.)  If a tax on natural resources is to have progressive redistributive effects, there 
is a case for suggesting it should be levied on those who ultimately derive more economic 
benefit from the exploitation of raw resources rather than on those who, engaged in primary 
extraction, will generally yield the least added value from the resource.  As Heath observes, 
under the GRD ‘the “value-added” by the wealthy nations would be almost entirely untaxed, 
because their production is more capital-intensive.’13  And I’d note that raw materials 
extracted have a very low economic value compared to finished products, so why levy a tax 
on a relatively small component of value?  This leaves those most dependent on raw material 
exports liable to taxes while the industrialised rich are much more marginally affected, even 
though their command of resources (calculated fully in terms of ecological space, as I shall 
discuss in the next section) is much greater. 
 Another element of arbitrariness concerns the secondary rationale for the GRD, 
namely, that a tax on natural resources will generally tend to favour their conservation and 
that a tax on resources such as petroleum more particularly will work in favour of 
environmental protection.  Pogge thinks the GRD will have considerable benefits for 
protection and conservation,14  but this seems doubtful.15   A marginal tax on the activities is 
more likely to have a marginal impact on them, assuming demand is not completely elastic.  
Moreover, since the primary aim of the tax is to generate revenues from which the poor might 
benefit, in order that they too can make use of the resources from which they are currently, in 
Pogge’s own words, involuntarily excluded, the secondary aim could in fact be annulled by 
it.  In short, one cannot have it both ways.  The only effects one can anticipate with 
reasonable assuredness would be that the economic costs of polluting or depleting resources 
would be subject to marginal redistribution, not that pollution or resource depletion would be 
diminished (even marginally).   
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 It has therefore to be concluded that the GRD should not necessarily be expected 
efficaciously to achieve its ends,16  either the primary one of effecting progressive economic 
redistribution or the incidental one of environmental protection and resource conservation.  In 
order to try to get it to achieve at least its primary end, it is arguable that in its 
implementation the GRD would have to be so tweaked as to conform more to the principle 
‘tax the rich and redistribute to the poor’ than that of compensation for the latter’s exclusion 
from access to natural resources, which is the moral argument Pogge invokes in support of 
the proposal.  Thus critics like Heath maintain the further conclusion that it is profoundly 
arbitrary to relate global redistributive taxes to natural resources at all.  In the next section I 
show why this further conclusion can, however, be firmly resisted.   
 
 
3. Reconceptualising natural resources and the justice of their distribution 
In what follows I sketch a perspective from which the problems noted can be diagnosed as 
arising from what can be seen as a flaw in the conceptual framing of the GRD proposal.  
Revealing this flaw leads to the suggestion of an alternative type of proposal for achieving 
the ends the GRD aims at. 
 I would note, to begin with, that this flaw is not the one that Heath has claimed to 
identify.  In his view, ‘[t]he underlying fallacy lies in thinking that wealthy nations are 
wealthy because they consume so many resources.’  Heath claims, contrariwise, that it is 
because they are wealthy that they consume so much.  Explaining the problem with Pogge’s 
view will be at the same time to explain the problem with this one. 
 The point of departure for this explanation, though, is one where I have expressed 
agreement with Heath.  As noted, it is arbitrary to focus on primary extraction from an 
economic point of view, given that greater wealth is generated at subsequent stages of the 
productive process.  The next step, though, is to recognise that wealth itself represents the 
command of resources, and thus to emphasise that there is further arbitrariness in supposing 
that only at the point of extraction does the economy have to do with natural resources.  For 
natural resources are not ‘used up’ in their extraction; nor do they disappear at any point in 
the processes of production, exchange and consumption; they are certainly not destroyed, as 
Pogge implies.17   What actually happens is that their form and composition change.  The 
physical and energetic constituents of raw materials and fuels continue to be embodied in the 
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products manufactured from them; the constituents that are not embodied in the products are 
also not destroyed but rather contribute to changes in the environment - changes which can 
also be conceived in terms of utilisation of the environment itself as a resource in providing 
absorption services. Thus those who valorise resources, even in increasingly ‘refined’ forms, 
are all the time drawing benefits from natural resources in one state or another which are 
under their command.  From this perspective, then, I would note that Heath’s question of 
whether consumption causes wealth or wealth causes consumption appears misposed: wealth 
and consumption are not two discrete phenomena that have some sort of serial causal linkage 
one way or the other.  Wealth just is the command of resources, all of which in the final 
analysis are natural resources.  The ‘productive consumption’ of resources produces wealth; 
wealth itself represents the command of resources which can be consumed, ‘productively’ or 
otherwise. 
 It is important also to accept that while enjoying the benefits of ‘consuming’ 
resources, productively or otherwise, one is simultaneously creating disbenefits in the form of 
environmental pollution.  The negative environmental impacts of productive processes should 
not be abstracted from broader issues concerning the effective command of natural resources.  
Conceptually it would be artificial, and practically it would be inappropriate, to consider 
‘environmental bads’ and ‘environmental goods’ as entirely separate sets of phenomena.  
There is just one biophysical reality to which the various categorisations of environmental 
goods and bads relate.  To put the point, which derives from basic principles of physics, in 
homespun terms: “everything goes somewhere”. 
 This general perspective I am proposing is most vividly captured with the concept of 
‘ecological space’.18   Systematic attempts in recent years to account for the biophysical basis 
and impacts of human economic activity have led to the development of converging 
methodologies to determine the total amount of biologically productive land and water area 
required to produce the resources consumed and to assimilate the wastes generated using 
prevailing technology.  This aggregated amount is referred to as ‘ecological space’; and the 
use or ‘occupation’ of an amount of it is referred to as an ‘ecological footprint’.19   Ecological 
footprint accounts express in ‘global hectares’ the amount of biologically productive space 
with ‘world average productivity’ which is necessary to maintain the current material 
throughput of the human economy under current management and production practices.  The 
footprint is not made on a continuous piece of land; it corresponds to the aggregate land and 
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water area in various ecosystem categories that is drawn on by that nation.  Wherever the 
particular resources it utilises may have originated, their production required amounts of 
ecological space.  So in the total ecological space a nation’s economy disposes of, its own 
territorial endowment may figure as a greater or smaller proportion.  The ecological footprint 
of a nation measures its total resource consumption by adding imports to, and subtracting 
exports from, its domestic production.   
 Whatever operational difficulties and debates about value assumptions may be 
involved in actually supplying such accounts, the methodology of calculating ecological 
footprints is sufficiently refined at least to make meaningful comparisons between nations.  
Such accounts in fact depict a pattern of distribution which does have significant correlations 
with the distribution of economic wealth.20    They thus tend to confirm, more decisively than 
Pogge’s conceptual framework allows one to recognise, that a country’s wealth indeed 
depends on its command of natural resources, providing that we take a full account of the 
resources at its disposition and not only of those which happen to be its natural territorial 
allotment. 
 Taking this perspective thus enables us not only to endorse, but also to help explain 
the basis of, Pogge’s claim that ‘the better-off enjoy significant advantages in the use of a 
single natural resource base from whose benefits the worse-off are largely, and without 
compensation, excluded’.  The mistake of supposing that these advantages arise in any direct 
way from utilising the natural resources found on a particular territory21 is avoided by 
conceiving of resources in terms of ecological space.  Pogge’s statement correctly refers to 
the benefits the rich derive from the single global natural resource base.  Territorial 
possession of a part of that base is not necessary to yield the benefits in question.  
 Adopting this perspective on natural resources also allows us to forge a clearer and 
more robust link between redistributive proposals and their normative underpinnings than 
Pogge has been able to establish for the GRD.  Regarding the normative foundations of his 
argument, Pogge has claimed that the GRD ‘operates as a modern Lockean proviso.’22  Yet 
he also says it ‘differs from Locke’s own proviso by giving up the vague and unwieldy 
condition of “leaving enough and as good for others”.’23  However, the proviso need not be 
vague or unwieldy if applied to the appropriation of ecological space, I shall argue, and ought 
not to be given up, but, on the contrary, insisted upon.  On Pogge’s modified conception of 
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the proviso, the difference, he says, is that one may use unlimited amounts, but one must 
share ‘some of the economic benefit.’24  Yet it is a material impossibility for inequalities to 
grow indefinitely and still yield gains for the worst off.  This is because economic growth (as 
distinct from inflation) does in the aggregate represent increased use of natural resources.  
The depletion of available resources can wipe out the gains of the worst off - those who have 
traded away their resources - before it seriously affects the richer who are still working with 
the gains accruing as a result of the compound advantages they enjoy over the poor.  
Accordingly I want to argue that the original Lockean proviso should be preserved in a 
contemporary recontextualisation.25   
 The utilisation of ecological space can and should be conceived of as the ongoing 
initial appropriation of nature by humans.  The idea of initial appropriation may conjure 
images of direct physical interaction with a parcel of territory, but there is no particularistic 
territorial reference for the concept of ecological space other than the planet earth as a whole; 
physical interaction with the natural world continues to occur not only in prospecting and 
cultivating, but also through the production, pollution, use and disposal of all physical 
products - and even as they change hands through trade.  The initial appropriation of natural 
resources is precisely what ecological footprint accounts track.  The utilisation of an amount 
of ecological space by any particular party would accordingly be just if, adapting the Lockean 
proviso, ‘as much and as good’ ecological space remains to be utilised by all other parties.  
But since any given amount of ecological space is as a point of methodological principle ‘as 
good’ as any other equal amount, then the proviso would require that as much ecological 
space remain for utilisation by others. 
 When ecological space utilisation is conceived as initial appropriation, therefore, the 
only inequalities that are justified are those achieved by a more efficient extraction of 
benefits from one’s equal share of ecological space.  It is worth emphasising that there is a 
difference between allowing efficiency gains from an equal share of a single resource base 
and justifying inequalities in the share of the resource base itself.  Thus the concept of 
efficiency, as related to the use of ecological space, has a narrowly defined meaning: it refers 
to the economic gains that can be achieved from the more productive use of a given amount 
of ecological space.  Such inequalities would tend to be localised, temporary and marginal.  
The vast and systematic inequalities globally which Pogge depicts could not be justified at all 
on the revised understanding of the Lockean proviso I have sketched.  At this point it 
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therefore seems appropriate to suggest that a global tax proportional to a nation’s per capita 
utilisation of ecological space would answer to the demands of Pogge’s moral argument more 
thoroughly and less arbitrarily than the GRD.26  
 This brings me, finally, to remark that the potential effects of Pogge’s GRD may in 
fact be even more modest than he supposes.  In explaining why he thinks even a very modest 
GRD may have significant effects Pogge refers to the difference between longer term 
compound inequalities and ‘ordinary centrifugal tendencies of market systems’.  ‘Present 
radical inequality’,27  he observes, ‘is the cumulative result of decades and centuries in which 
the more affluent societies and groups have used their advantages in capital and knowledge to 
expand these advantages further.’28  He appears to believe, however, that if the worst effects 
of uneven historical accumulation could be assuaged then even quite a small GRD ‘may, in 
the context of a fair and open global market system, be sufficient continuously to balance 
those ordinary centrifugal tendencies in markets enough to forestall its reemergence.’29  Yet I 
believe this claim may seriously underestimate the continuing relevance of the longer-term 
compound advantages with which the ordinary centrifugal tendencies are contrasted.  In a 
world of finite resources, indefinite economic growth is not possible.  A ‘fair and open global 
market system’ can only facilitate the transfer of the resources that exist, not produce more, 
except perhaps at the margin.  There is reason to think that accumulated advantages in terms 
of capital wealth may simply be amplified by a market system, even a ‘fair’ one.  Cumulative 
historical advantages can be seen as the basis for continued systematic advantages that might 
more than offset the countervailing contribution of a GRD.  Here I would refer to the account 
offered by Alf Hornborg of how natural resource inequalities and economic inequalities are 
mutually reinforcing in a cumulative and systematic fashion.  Taking the biophysical 
perspective which I have already commended, Hornborg argues that global patterns of trade 
can be viewed as revealing a prevalent occurrence of an ‘unequal exchange of resources’.  
This is made visible ‘by identifying, beneath the flows of monetary exchange value, uneven 
flows of real resources such as energy, labour time, and hectares of land productivity.’30  A 
key point is that from the biophysical perspective, finished products represent an increase in 
entropy and material disorder compared to the resources from which they were produced, 
even though from an economic view they have a greater value as represented by price.  
Accordingly, if we take a longitudinal view of the transformation of a given set of natural 
resources - fuels and raw materials - into an industrial product, we find a negative correlation 
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between, on the one hand, the amount of negative entropy and usable material embodied in a 
product and, on the other, its price.  Hornborg spells out the socio-economic consequences of 
this negative correlation: ‘industrial centers exporting high-utility commodities will 
automatically gain access to ever greater amounts of available energy from their hinterlands. 
The more energy they have dissipated today, the more “new” energy they will be able to 
buy—and dissipate—tomorrow.’31  This process has clear distributive implications inasmuch 
as industrialism implies a social transfer of entropy, and of usable materials.  It is because of 
the social transfer of entropy and material, according to Hornborg, that world trade can be 
regarded as exploitative - of the poor by the rich - in relation to natural resources.  As 
pressures on natural resources increase, so too one would expect the ‘ordinary centrifugal 
tendencies’ inherent in the global market system to intensify rather than be held in check.  So 
to suppose that a ‘fair’ market system superimposed on a situation of dramatic and systematic 
inequalities with respect to the command of resources would prevent the further 
intensification of deprivation and exploitation of the world’s poor is, I believe, mistaken.   
 My main criticisms of the GRD, though, are made not on account of its being a 
modest step in the right direction, but on account of doubts as to whether it is unequivocally a 
step in the right direction at all.  
 
4. Some remarks on the moral argument 
In this article I am not attempting to present a fully-fledged alternative proposal so much as to 
suggest the basis for one.  Nonetheless, as I am also claiming that its basis is more firmly 
rooted in Pogge’s own moral argument than is his GRD, a comment is in order on the 
potential objection that the approach I commend in fact somewhat shifts its moorings away 
from the specific moral argument Pogge deploys in support of the GRD proposal.   
 Of the three possible approaches Pogge identifies as supporting a principle of global 
redistribution, the one he actually uses is arguably the least controversial in terms of its basic 
premises.  This approach centres on the claim that ‘the better-off enjoy significant advantages 
in the use of a single natural resource base from whose benefits the worse-off are largely, and 
without compensation, excluded.’32   It can be said to appeal to the idea that the territorial 
distribution of natural resources on our globe is a consequence of brute luck and thus morally 
arbitrary;  disadvantages arising from these morally arbitrary circumstances are therefore not 
‘deserved’, and justice requires that they be rectified.33  Now because my proposal does not 
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confine attention to raw natural resources as they are found lying in, on or above the ground, 
it could be said to forego the basic advantage of being able to appeal to such a clear 
distinction between ‘deserved’ and ‘undeserved’ benefits, and thus have less compelling 
normative force than Pogge’s does by preserving that distinction.  In response,34  I shall say 
first why I do not think that Pogge’s position is actually so distinct on this score from the one 
I advocate, and then why the available normative force is anyway not diluted for my proposal.  
 To begin with, then, I question whether Pogge’s moral argument avails itself of the 
pure moral force of the ‘undeserved’ character of natural resources.  When setting out his 
GRD proposal, Pogge mentions three distinct approaches to justifying global redistribution as 
a matter of justice. In his argument for the GRD he makes explicit appeal to just the one 
approach that centres on the injustice of uncompensated exclusion with regard to natural 
resources.  The other two approaches, which he sets aside, focus respectively on the ‘effects 
of shared institutions’ and ‘effects of a common and violent history’. According to the former, 
‘there is a shared institutional order that is shaped by the better-off and imposed on the worse-
off’ which ‘is implicated in the reproduction of radical inequality’.35   According to the latter, 
‘[t]he social starting positions of the worse-off and the better-off have emerged from a single 
historical process that was pervaded by massive, grievous wrongs.’36  
 I draw attention to these other two approaches in order first to acknowledge the 
possible objection to my own proposal that it trades on these in order to account for the 
recurrent and historical ‘ecological debt’ which I claim should be repaid, and so dilutes the 
clear moral force of the approach Pogge actually appeals to.  My other, more immediate, 
reason for highlighting them is that I wish to claim the three approaches are not quite so 
separable as Pogge suggests.  In fact, I do not think the ‘uncompensated exclusion’ approach 
is simultaneously distinct and complete at all.  For Pogge’s purposes, it has to be sufficiently 
complete to add a distinct reason for redistribution over and above the positive duties of 
assistance that other theories might support as a matter of benevolence or humanity.  This is 
because Pogge’s aim is to show that radical inequality globally represents a violation of a 
stringent negative duty.37   To establish the violation of a negative duty requires showing that 
the agents bound by it are doing something they ought not do, and that what they are doing 
materially causes the deprivation in question.  The approaches that appeal to ‘shared 
institutions’ and ‘common history’ both incorporate explanatory hypotheses of the requisite 
kind.  The ‘uncompensated exclusion’ approach, however, consists purely in description - and 
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a description of a state of affairs which could be a result of the causes invoked by the 
explanatory approaches.  At any rate, the description is not accompanied by any new 
explanatory hypothesis about how the advantages of the better-off come about or how the 
exclusion of the worse-off is effected.  What Pogge characterises are the unjust effects: ‘The 
global poor get to share the burdens resulting from the degradation of our natural environment 
while having to watch helplessly as the affluent distribute the planet’s abundant natural 
wealth amongst themselves.’38   The only hint of causality and agency comes at the end of his 
brief discussion: ‘the citizens and governments of the affluent states are therefore violating a 
negative duty of justice when they, in collaboration with the ruling elites of the poor 
countries, coercively exclude the poor from a proportional resource share.’39   He does not 
suggest that the causality of coercive exclusion here is other than that posited by the shared 
institutions approach.  
 So I claim that Pogge’s complete moral argument for the justice of the GRD does not 
rest on a purer appeal to the undeserved character of natural resources than my own proposal 
does.    
 Nonetheless, perhaps Pogge’s strategy in proposing the GRD is intended not to require 
the complete moral argument - i.e. including the explanatory hypotheses - because the GRD is 
proposed as a modest rectificatory measure rather than an attempt to implement full 
distributive justice globally.  The elements of arbitrariness which I have criticised it for could 
then be seen simply as confirmation that it is not a systematic argument for redistribution 
from rich to poor of the kind which needs to appeal to the explanatory approaches.  The 
arbitrariness of territorial endowments might then just suffice.  While I have doubts about 
this, as are explained elsewhere,40  I shall let the matter rest here. 
 So the objection may be pressed against my own approach that this achieves a closer 
correlation between tax levels and wealth levels only by diluting the normative force derived 
from the correlation of the tax to undeserved natural assets.   
 However, my first response to this objection is to claim that on the contrary, as a 
matter of principle, by conceiving of natural resources as ecological space, the latter 
correlation is more perfectly maintained since all the use of natural resources - and not merely 
a one-off transaction involving (some of) them - is accounted for.  So if an ecological space 
tax is anticipated to have a generally progressive effect among economically unequal nations 
the reason is that levels of ecological space usage tend to correlate empirically with levels of 
15 
economic wealth.  The normative justification for levying the tax, however, relates not to the 
degree of wealth of a nation (as might indeed compromise the appeal to ‘undeserved’ natural 
assets) but to the degree of their excess use of ecological space.  So the normative force at the 
level of basic principles is in no way diluted. 
 Nonetheless, it may still be objected that a tax which applies to all resource use, 
including all the various stages of production and consumption, may fail to distinguish in its 
impact between the value attributable to natural resource inputs (‘undeserved’ and thus liable 
for redistribution) and the value added through labour and technology (‘deserved’ and thus 
not liable for redistribution).  This might be a real concern if separate products or producers 
were to be taxed. However, that is not envisaged.  My proposal, like Pogge’s, envisages that 
the tax would be levied on nations.  Unlike the GRD, though, which targets specific 
resources, a tax on aggregate ecological space use would leave national governments with the 
discretion to decide exactly how to raise the revenue.  I see no objection to nations making 
fiscal arrangements that support some ecologically costly enterprises, provided that they make 
up for the ecological deficit in other sectors, making domestic ecological subsidies across 
sectors or firms as they see fit.   
 A version of the objection, however, might still be held to apply even when nations 
are recognized to be the relevant units of assessment.  Imagine this scenario: Nation A is 
richer per capita than Nation B; Nation A is more resource efficient than Nation B; Nation A 
also uses more resources per capita than either Nation B or its own just allowance. How, then, 
do we know how much of Nation A’s wealth comes from resource efficiency and how much 
from resource overuse? My answer is that ‘we’ (thinking as theorists of justice) do not need to 
(even if a national government will have good reason to work it out in order to know how best 
to raise the revenue it owes). All ‘we’ need to know is that Nation A is in ‘ecological debt’41  
due to its overuse. And how do we know how much that debt should be taken to amount to in 
economic terms?  An illustrative, broadbrush, answer is: divide the global wealth by world 
population; divide global ecospace by world population; thereby arrive at a monetary 
equivalent for units of ecological space.42  But I anticipate the rejoinder: suppose Nation A is 
more efficient in its use of ecological space than are other nations; were it not for that 
efficiency, the aggregate global economic value of global ecological space would be less; 
therefore, as a consequence of its efficiency, Nation A has to pay more than if it had been 
inefficient, and this runs counter to justice.  A response might be to adopt this principle: 
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calculate total ecological space utilised by all nations except Nation A; calculate all wealth 
except that of Nation A; then tax Nation A according to the resultant economic value of 
ecological space. I would not wish to lose sight, however, of the fact that the real remedy 
ultimately aimed at is to let all nations which overuse ecological space reduce their usage to 
the permitted amount- so then they would be able to retain the benefits deriving purely from 
efficient use of it. 
 So I would affirm that the requirement of sensitivity to the demands of desert can in 
fact be met for my proposal.  The economic benefits derived from one’s equal ecological 
space entitlement can be considered ‘deserved’; gains derived from the utilisation of an 
excess amount of ecological space cannot be considered deserved, whatever ingenuity or 
industriousness was applied in yielding them. Unless, that is, an entitlement to more than 
one’s equal share can itself be shown to be deserved: but an argument showing that would 




In view of the criticisms of arbitrariness that can reasonably be levelled at the GRD proposal, 
I conclude by affirming four reasons to favour instead levying a tax proportional to a nation’s 
ecological footprint.  First, it relates to the use of all resources, not just a small selection.  
Secondly, it relates to the use of resources at each stage of their use, rather than just at the 
stage of their first extraction.  In both of these respects an ecological space tax would be less 
arbitrary in its incidence than the GRD.  Thirdly, ecological footprint accounts factor in all 
environmental effects of resource utilisation rather than the partial and marginal 
environmental effects of the GRD.  Fourthly, an ecological space tax, because it tracks the 
use of natural resources even as they are valorised in the economic process, falls 
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